Helpful Quote

All,

I just read something regarding Aristotle's Ethics that is relevant and helpful for our discussion of Kant. Joe Sachs, quite possibly the most talented reader of ancient Greek alive, says of Aristotle's account of virtue that it is misunderstood and misrepresented by some as an artificial or "second" nature that we superimpose over our actual or primary nature. This is false, for "it is only in the moral virtues that we possess our primary nature, that in which all our capacities can have their full development. Moral virtue does not constrain a human being but completes us as a roof completes a house. The sign of what is natural, for Aristotle, is pleasure, but we have to know how to read the signs. Things pleasant by nature, he says, have no opposite pain and no excess, because they set us free to act simply as what we are " (Nicomachean Ethics, xv). This is an excellent way to describe both Aristotle and Kant's conception of their respective works (and helps explain why Kant discusses pleasure and happiness at the beginning of his work: he is completing Aristotle's work by correcting the locus of concern, not entirely divorcing himself from it). Regardless of whether Aristotle espouses virtue ethics or Kant his deontology, they both consider an individual's characteristic activity as a human being to be enacted or activated rather than spontaneously occurring. Put another way, they both would agree to a certain extent with Rousseau that we are incapable of acting freely (or, in Aristotle's terminology, as truly "human") if we are unreflective about our actions, as we then don't even know if our actions stem from external influences (for Kant and Aristotle, the inclinations or desires; for Rousseau, society). The point is that even if you think you are acting freely, if you have not explored your own self and your influences, if you have not done the work of moral philosophy, then you can't even tell the difference. However, if you do this work first--regardless of the results--then "once the earliest habits are neutralized, our desires are disentangled from the pressure for immediate gratification [read: to our inclinations or society's ingrained dictates], we are calm enough to think, and most important, we can see what is in front of us in all its possibility" (xix).

To act without reflection is by definition to be a slave, as you literally can only make a decision if it is a choice between known alternatives. Otherwise it is not a choice. In other words, even if you disagree with Kant or Rousseau, the validity of your disagreement is based upon your ability to articulate a justification of your actions--thereby proving that you to some extent, in principle, actually agree with them. (Of course, if your disagreement is invalid and is based solely on inclinations, e.g., "I don't agree with Kant because I like my life and I think his life would be boring or hateful or isn't borne out in experience or people are naturally selfish and duplicitous, etc.," then you are again proving them right by providing an unreflective disagreement which is based on external influences and betrays your sense of freedom of choice. This is not to say that they are absolutely, objectively "right." It is to say that in order to disagree with them you must understand their ideas sufficiently first--otherwise you may unwittingly provide an example which proves their points.)

Hope that helps.

-W.